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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Soft errors are logical faults in a circuit's operation that do not reflect a permanent 
malfunction of the device. These errors are the result of particle strikes typically caused 
by: (1) alpha particles from package decay, (2) cosmic rays that produce energetic 
protons and neutrons, and (3) thermal neutrons [1],[2]. These particle strikes can be 
observed as flipped bits at the output of the affected node. If the strike occurs while the 
node is not in use (or not being latched), then the fault is masked from the output, and 
normal execution occurs. Because of masking, a circuit with a low frequency of soft 
errors could potentially be immune to a visible malfunction. However, there have been 
numerous studies to show that soft errors in microelectronics are a growing trend 
detected error to technology scaling [3-5]. [3][4][5]. 
When a soft error occurs in the control flow logic of a microprocessor, there is a 
risk that an incorrect instruction will be executed. This can cause incorrect data to be 
stored into memory or complete failure of the application currently executing. Because of 
this vulnerability, there has been significant work dedicated to solving this problem by 
monitoring the control flow of the program [6-8].[6][7][8]. 
Control-flow monitoring techniques can be implemented at the hardware level, 
software level, or a combination of the two. Many control-flow error detection schemes 
use full software or hardware-assisted software techniques that involve redundant 
execution [7] or application-level watchdog timers [9]. However, these software 
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techniques usually rely on information from the application to implement error detection. 
The goal of this thesis was to implement a hardware-only control-flow error detection 
scheme, using the system state information that is only available within the 
microarchitecture and not visible at the application layer. In addition, the hardware used 
to monitor the control flow was minimized as a secondary goal.
This thesis presents a design to monitor the control flow of a processor by 
assigning a temporal signature to each instruction; the signature is based upon the 
remaining service time of the instruction. The processor considered as a testbed for this 
work was the MIPS R2000, which is a 32-bit processor implemented with five pipeline 
stages. Software-based fault injection simulations showed that the design detected over 
80% of errors while running the Dhrystone synthetic computing benchmark. Logic 
synthesis results show that the monitoring circuitry increases the overall area of the MIPS 
processor by less than 1%.
The organization of this thesis is as follows. Chapter II presents a detailed 
explanation of the mechanisms associated with radiation-induced soft errors and control 
flow errors. Mitigation of radiation-induced soft errors implemented in the 
microarchitecture of a processor is described in Chapter III. Chapter IV gives a detailed 
description of the processor used in this study, including an overview of the instruction 
set architecture and the hardware description language (HDL) implementation. The 
TESM was first implemented using a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). The 
design was also synthesized for area, timing, and power analysis using a 45 nm CMOS 
technology cell library.  Chapter V provides the full specifications and implementation of 
the design, referred to as a Temporal Embedded Signature Monitor (TESM). Chapter VI 
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describes the simulation and test setup for this project. Fault injection was conducted at 
critical nodes while running the Dhrystone benchmark. Finally, Chapters VII shows the 
results from the simulation and circuit synthesis and compares these results to the 
unmodified MIPS processor as well as other soft error mitigation techniques. Chapter 
VIII summarizes the work and describes future extensions of TESM.
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CHAPTER II
IMPACT OF RADIATION-INDUCED SOFT ERRORS IN THE 
MICROARCHITECTURE
Overview of Microprocessor 
Computers systems are designed collaboratively and modularly from many angles 
of perspective. In order to understand the reliability concerns of a microprocessor, these 
viewpoints (or abstraction levels) must be understood. A computer system can be 
separated into the following abstraction layers: Application, Middleware, Operating 
System, Instruction Set Architecture, Microarchitecture, Circuits, and Device Physics. 
Figure 1 shows the order of connectivity between these levels. 
Applications are tools that function and are operated by means of a computer. 
Examples include word processors, spreadsheets, and media players. Applications are 
written in programming languages like C and Java. Middleware is the software that 
connects applications to the operating system. It generally consists of a library of 
functions that can allow applications to run without being specifically written for a 
particular operating system. Middleware is typically written in high level languages 
similar to those used for applications. An operating system coordinates tasks and 
manages hardware resources to optimize performance. Operating systems can be written 
in low-level programming languages like assembly, which is more closely mapped to the 
language that the hardware can interpret, or higher level languages like C. An Instruction 
Set Architecture (ISA) is the list and capabilities of all instructions that a processor can 
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execute as well as the specifications for the machine language. It acts as the interface 
between hardware and software. Microarchitecture is the description of the electrical 
circuitry of a computer necessary to implement the ISA. To implement the ISA and 
microarchitecture, Hardware Description Languages (HDLs) like Verilog and VHDL are 
used. The microarchitecture describes the logic gates used to implement the ISA. These 
logic gates can be created using circuits. Circuits are connections of components that are 
driven by current, such as resistors, capacitors, and inductors. An integrated circuit is a 
miniaturized circuit that has been fabricated on the surface of a thin substrate of 
semiconductor material. Microprocessors are an example of integrated circuits. Circuits 
can be designed and tested using schematic capture programs and simulators like 
Simulation Program with Integrated Circuit Emphasis (SPICE). Device physics are the 
mechanisms by which the circuit element is created including the materials used, the 
fabrication process, and the physical dimensions. This thesis focuses on improvements in 
the reliability of a microprocessor from the microarchitecture level.
[10]
Soft Errors
When an alpha particle or neutron strikes a circuit, it potentially generates charge 
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Figure 1: Levels of computer system 
abstraction [10]
sufficient enough to cause a malfunction. At the device physics level, as seen in Figure 2, 
the particle can strike the drain of a transistor, interact with the molecular structure of the 
semiconductor material (usually silicon), and generate electron-hole pairs. These 
electron-hole pairs diffuse towards the device contacts. This diffusion creates current and 
interferes with the normal operation of the transistor. Additionally, the movement of 
charge carriers creates drift current that also disrupts normal operation. At the 
microarchitecture level, a particle strike at a logic gate's input node can cause an incorrect 
output to occur for as long as the additional charge remains on the node. If a particle 
strikes the input of a storage cell (i.e., latch), the incorrect output can be stored within that 
storage cell, provided that the strike occurs while the storage cell is accepting inputs. 
Figure 2: Charge generation and collection in a reverse-biased junction: 
(a) formation of a cylindrical track of electron-hole pairs, (b) funnel 
shape extending high field depletion region deeper into substrate, (c) 
diffusion beginning to dominate collection process, and (d) the 
resultant current pulse caused by the passage of a high-energy ion. [11]
The ability of a particle strike to induce an error that affects correct execution of a 
circuit can be measured in terms of the Mean-Time-To-Fail (MTTF) and the Failure-In-
Time (FIT). The MTTF is a metric used to quantify the reliability of a circuit by 
observing the mean time expected for the first failure to occur. In order to determine the 
MTTF of two connected circuits that each have a known individual MTTF,  Equation 1 
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can be used.
MTTF combined=
1
1
MTTF 1

1
MTTF 2
 (1)
For easier calculation, the FIT metric is often used. One FIT means a failure occurs every 
billion hours. FIT relates to MTTF with Equation 2.
FIT = 10
9
24 x 365 x MTTF in years
 (2)
 The FIT of a given circuit can be viewed as a measure of the masking properties of the 
circuit. First, an open logic path must exist through which the transient can propagate to 
arrive at a latch or other memory element. If the transient does not occur on such a path, 
then it is said to be logically masked. The amount of logical masking in a circuit is known 
as the Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF). Also, the transient must be of sufficient 
amplitude and duration to change the state of the latch or memory element. If the 
transient fails to meet this requirement, then it is considered electrically masked. This 
electrical characteristic is known as the Intrinsic FIT. Finally, in synchronous logic, the 
transient must arrive at a time when the clock pulse enables the memory element. Failure 
to meet this requirement means that the transient was latch-window masked. This 
characteristic is known as the Timing Vulnerability Factor (TVF). These factors are 
considered when calculating the FIT and can be seen in Equation 3.
FIT =Σ AVFTVFIntrinsic FIT   (3)
When planning the architecture of a microprocessor, the FIT value can be used as a 
design constraint for reliability. However, accounting for TVF and Intrinsic FIT is not 
possible at the architecture level. Instead, design decisions at the architecture level, which 
this thesis addresses, typically impact the AVF.
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Architectural Vulnerability Factor
The physical manifestation of single events (e.g., transients, upsets) must occur in 
active computational structures to affect higher abstraction levels. Once a soft error is 
present, the impact on the software is dependent upon the architectural vulnerability 
factor as determined by the application executing on the IC. For soft-error reliability, 
architecture designers consider undetected errors, true detected errors, and false detected 
errors. This classification is similar to the error classification used by [12] and shown in 
Figure 3. If a soft error causes a bit flip but the bit is not used before it returns to a correct 
state, as seen in Outcome 1, then it is considered a benign fault. If the faulty bit is 
corrected, as seen in Outcome 2, then an error no longer exists. If this faulty bit is used, 
but does not affect the output of the program, as seen in Outcome 3, it is also considered 
benign. An example of this situation can be observed with an “OR” gate. Consider two 
input signals “A” and “B”. If “A” is given the logic value “1”, then the output of the 
“OR” gate will be “1” regardless of the value of “B”. Therefore, a bit flip at “B” does not 
matter because it does not affect the outcome of the program. If the faulty bit matters and 
goes undetected, as seen in Outcome 4, then it is considered an undetected error. A benign 
error that is detected, as seen in Outcome 5, is considered a false detected error. A faulty 
bit that affects the output and is detected and not corrected, as seen in Outcome 6, is 
categorized as a true detected error.
Detected errors are potentially less dangerous to the operation of a microprocessor 
than undetected errors because they can be flagged by the hardware and mitigated by the 
application. For example, a memory structure can be monitored with parity and have a 
signal sent to the application when a parity mismatch occurs. Undetected errors do not 
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provide any information about the location or time of the error, leaving the system 
completely unprepared. Therefore, it is imperative to reduce the amount of undetected 
errors as much as possible.
Control-bit/Control-flow Errors
Control-bit errors have a significant impact on the program flow of a 
microprocessor. Control bits are the signals that activate the hardware necessary to 
execute the current instruction. For example, in the instruction ADD R3, R1, R2, the 
instruction code that signifies an ADD is found in the control bits. Additionally, the 
control bits inform the hardware that the value of two operands to be added can be found 
in Register 1 and Register 2, and the answer should be stored in Register 3. For this 
thesis, the control bits that determine which instruction will be executed are referred to as 
control-flow bits. When undetected errors occur in the control-flow bits of a 
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Figure 3: Soft Error Classification Flow Chart [12]. Silent Data Corruptions (SDC) 
are undetected bit-level errors. Detected Unrecoverable Errors (DUE) are detected 
bit-level errors that are not corrected.
microprocessor, there is a risk that an incorrect instruction will be executed. This can 
result in incorrect data being stored into memory or complete failure of the application 
[12].
A previous investigation into the effects of errors on control-flow bits can be 
found in [13]. This study defined the following: (1) operation errors - a change in the 
operation code used, (2) operand errors - a change in or premature use of the 
register/operand addressed, (3) execution errors - a change in the functional units used, 
(4) timing errors - the instruction beginning or ending at an incorrect time, and (5) order  
errors - a commitment order violation. Through statistical fault injection simulations, it 
was determined that timing errors were the dominant group of control-flow errors. This 
result provided insight for the error detection approach discussed later in this thesis.
The goal of this thesis was to develop a method for reducing the impact of control 
flow errors in a microprocessor. In the 32-bit instruction word of a RISC processor, the 
control-flow bits (as defined above) are the “opcode” bits and the “funct” bits denoted in 
red in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Distinction between control bits, control-flow bits, and data 
bits in a 32-bit implementation of the MIPS RISC processor.
CHAPTER III
MITIGATION OF SOFT ERRORS IN THE MICROARCHITECTURE
In order to protect against soft errors at the architecture level, several techniques 
have been used including error detection and correction (EDAC) codes [14], triple 
modular redundancy (TMR)[15], and built-in-self-test (BIST)[16]. EDAC works by 
generating additional bits that contain information about the data word and appending 
that to the data word. TMR requires three copies of a component operating 
simultaneously with their outputs compared and voted to eliminate single faults. This 
method can be seen in Figure 5. BIST allows for accurate soft error characterization 
which can be coupled with other mitigation techniques [17]. 
Figure 5: Example of Triple Modular Redundancy. A soft error occurs at Node 1 causing 
the bit to flip from "1" to "0". The other two nodes are unaffected. The three outputs are 
compared and the majority determines an overall output of "1".
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Because of the critical vulnerability of control bits, there have been many 
solutions proposed to specifically solve this problem by monitoring the control flow of 
the program [6-8], including the solution in this thesis, embedded signature monitoring.
[6][7][8]
Embedded signature monitoring is used to check the control flow of a 
microprocessor. Usually, the monitor receives an instruction and interprets a pattern 
specific to that instruction, known as a signature. This signature is a numeric symbol that 
can represent any known behavior about the output node. For instance, in [18], the 
signature is the ordered list of instructions to be executed by the program, as determined 
during compilation. The monitor stores the signature (either statically hard-coded or 
dynamically obtained during run-time) at the beginning of execution and compares it 
with the information obtained in a later execution step. A visual representation of this 
setup can be seen in Figure 6. The signature is usually generated using code compaction 
hardware like linear feedback shift registers. This allows for the signature generating 
hardware to be small relative to complete duplication of the hardware. The design of the 
embedded signature monitor used for this study is discussed in Chapter V.
12
Figure 6: A General Signature Monitor
CHAPTER IV
MIPS PROCESSOR
The MIPS R2000 processor from [19] was used as a testbed to implement the 
control-flow monitor. A MIPS processor is a Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC). 
The MIPS R2000 structure is shown in Figure 7. The processor completes an instruction 
in five stages: Fetch, Decode, Execute, Memory, and Write-Back. In the Fetch stage, the 
instruction is loaded from memory based on the address given by the program counter. In 
the Decode stage, the instruction word is separated into the control bits necessary to 
execute the instruction and the operands that will be used by the instruction. In the 
Execute stage, the operation specified by the instruction is executed.  In the Memory 
stage, any calls to memory that are necessary for instruction completion are performed. In 
the Write-back stage, the instruction writes its result into the register file.
The MIPS R2000 processor has a 32-bit word length, and instructions have three 
formats: R-type, I-type, and J-type. Figure 4 gives a visual representation of for the 
instruction word separated into each format. R-type instructions are typically for 
instructions that require three operands. I-type instructions are for instructions like load, 
store, or branch that use immediate constants. J-type instructions are for jump instructions 
that significantly alter the program counter. 
The control-flow bits of the 32-bit instruction word are the opcode (instruction 
word bits 31-26) and the function code (instruction word bits 5-0). The control-flow 
monitor aims to protect these 12 bits. However, each instruction does not require all of 
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the control bits. For R-type instructions, the opcode field (bits 31 to 26) and the function 
code (bits 5 to 0) are required for correct control flow. For I-format and J-format 
instructions, only the opcode (bits 31 to 26) are required for correct control flow. 
The cycle-by-cycle instruction flow for the MIPS R2000 processor can be seen in 
Figure 8. Unconditional branches using an immediate operand require two cycles to 
complete. Unconditional branches using a register and conditional branches require three 
cycles to complete. Arithmetic, logical, and store operations require four cycles to 
complete, and load operations require five cycles to complete. Accounting for single-bit 
flips only, each instruction has a limited number of soft error bit-flip combinations that 
will transform it into another realizable instruction. For instance, the load instruction is 
assigned the operation code “100011” and takes 5 cycles to complete.  If a bit-flip occurs 
14
Figure 7: MIPS R2000 Architecture [19]
on the most significant bit, the operation code will be transformed to “000011”, which 
does not match the operation code for any other instruction in the instruction set. The 
time for this unknown instruction to complete depends upon the cycle in which the fault 
was injected (and typically occurs in that cycle). However, if a bit-flip occurs on the third 
most significant bit, the operation code will be transformed from “100011” to “101011”, 
which is equivalent to the operation code for the store instruction. This could cause the 
instruction to finish in 4 cycles. From this knowledge, an inherent susceptibility to soft 
errors and detectability of the TESM can be predicted.  In the general case, each 
instruction is susceptible to a soft error at least for bit flips that cause a transition to 
another realizable instruction. This can be considered the lower bound for error 
susceptibility since it assumes that a change to an unrealizable instruction finishes in a 
time different from the original instruction. For the load instruction, only one of the six 
opcode bits can cause a transition to another realizable instruction (the store instruction) 
so the error susceptibility is 16.67%. Therefore, arithmetic, logical, and store operations 
that encounter a soft error will only generate a unique signature if the bit-flip causes the 
instruction to be read as a branch instruction or a load instruction.  
15
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Figure 8: MIPS Instruction Flow Chart [19]
Table 1: Error susceptibility of each instruction by mathematical reasoning
Instruction Opcode Single-bit transitions Cycle Time % Susceptible% Detectable
Load 100011 Store 5 16.67 100
Store 101011 Load 4 16.67 100
ALU 000000 J, BNE, ADDI, JR* 4 66.67 75
Add Immediate 001000 ALU/JR, ANDI, ADDIU 4 50 25
Add Immediate Unsigned 001001 ORI, ADDI 4 33.33 0
And Immediate 001100 ORI, ANDI, BEQ 4 50 33.33
Or Immediate 001101 ANDI, BNE 4 33.33 50
Jump 000010 ALU/JR 2 16.67 100
Branch on Equal 000100 ALU/JR, BNE, ANDI 3 50 50
Branch on Not Equal 000101 BEQ, ORI 3 33.33 50
Jump Register 000000 J, BNE, ADDI, ALU* 3 66.67 75
* - transition caused by error in funct bits
VHDL Implementation
In the design of a microprocessor, a formal description of the digital logic is 
written using a Hardware Description Language (HDL). HDLs allow circuit designer to 
represent hardware semantics without mapping the design to a specific technology. For 
instance, when a full adder is specified in an HDL, it is known that the gate receives two 
inputs and generates an output equivalent to the addition of the inputs. However, it is not 
known how the full adder will be implemented when the circuit is fabricated. A full adder 
can be implemented using various combinations of gates. For instance, a full adder can be 
implemented using only NAND gates or by using a combination of XOR and Logical 
AND gates. Also, the logic that a full adder represents can be built using CMOS 
transistors, NMOS transistors, bipolar junction transistors, etc. In addition, the transistors 
used to build the gate are available in various sizes, causing performance characteristics 
to vary as well. 
An advantage of using an HDL is that a circuit designer can ensure that the logic 
of the circuit design operates correctly before committing the resources to build the 
circuit. This pre-build testing can be accomplished by using a HDL Integrated 
Development Environment (IDE). HDL IDEs can contain a source code editor, a 
compiler that parses the HDL code to determine syntactic correctness, a simulator that 
interprets the behavior of the code as if it were implemented with hardware, and a 
debugger. 
The description for the MIPS R2000 processor used in this thesis was written in 
the Very-High-Speed Integrated Circuits Hardware Description Language, or VHDL. The 
VHDL IDE used for this thesis was Altera's Quartus II software in combination with 
17
ModelSim. 
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CHAPTER V
TEMPORAL EMBEDDED SIGNATURE MONITOR
Control flow monitoring techniques can be implemented at the hardware level, 
software level, or a combination of the two. The design used in this thesis implements a 
hardware-only control flow error detection scheme. This design satisfied the goal of 
exposing system information that is not available to the application, thus converting an 
undetected error to a detected error. In addition, the hardware used to monitor the control 
flow is minimized. 
Design Description
The control-flow monitor receives 12 control bits (specific to the MIPS R2000 
processor) during the same cycle that the decode stage receives the instruction in the 
processor. The monitor decodes the control bits into the amount of time (in cycles) 
required to complete the given instruction. This information is processor specific. This 
decoded information is sent through a register file that is synchronized with the 
processor's instruction pipeline. When an instruction commits, a signal is sent to the 
register that contains the timing information. For instance, in the MIPS R2000 
architecture, an ADD instruction takes three cycles after the fetch stage (four cycles in 
total) to complete. When the ADD instruction completes, it will send a signal to the 
control-flow monitor and the monitor will look in the third register to ensure that it 
contains the signal indicating a four-cycle instruction completion. This method takes 
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advantage of temporal and spatial redundancy because the information has to be in the 
correct register, and it has to contain the correct time. It also simplifies the design because 
additional hardware is not necessary to catch the correct instruction codes on the 
processor bus during times that the processor is not fetching an instruction. A visual 
representation of this method can be seen in Figure 9. Figure 10 provides a gate-level 
view.
20
Figure 9: Flow Chart of TESM operation
Figure 10: Gate level view of the temporal embedded signature monitor
Comparison to Related Designs
A similar idea to this is incorporated in [8] where a shadow register file was used 
to verify the contents of the registers for instructions that the application deemed critical. 
In this design, the register file contains the number of cycles for each instruction. The 
comparison that occurs is between the amount of time it took for the instruction to 
execute and the amount of time that the monitor decoded in the decode cycle of the 
instruction. This design has the advantage of completely removing detection 
responsibility from the application level. 
This design increases in size minimally with increased instruction complexity. 
Consider n as the number of distinct possible times it takes for a processor to complete an 
instruction. The register file that holds the completion time information would need log2 
(n) registers. For instance, the MIPS R2000 processor used for this thesis is capable of 
executing 31 types of instructions with four possible distinct execution times. It requires 
two registers to represent the four possible values for completion time.
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CHAPTER VI
EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
The VHDL model that was created for our design was implemented in an Altera 
DE2 Development and Education Board which uses a Cyclone II Field Programmable 
Gate Array (FPGA). To simulate a typical workload, the Dhrystone benchmark was 
chosen as the application that our design would run.  A software-based fault injection 
method was used to simulate soft errors and determine the effect of these errors on the 
circuit.
Instruction Characterization
In order to test the error detectability of an instruction, a simulation was 
performed on each instruction. In this simulation, each instruction was tested with known 
inputs and outputs, and a fault was injected during execution. The output of that 
instruction was compared to the expected output to see if the error was detected correctly.
Dhrystone Benchmark
The Dhrystone benchmark is a synthetic computing benchmark developed by 
Reinhold P. Weicker. Developed in 1984, it was one of the first industry standard 
benchmarks to represent general CPU performance for integer operations. The C version 
of this benchmark, used in this study, was created by Rick Richardson. The performance 
metric for the Dhrystone benchmark is the number of iterations of the main loop code per 
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second, known as a “Dhrystone MIPS”.
The Dhrystone benchmark was used for this thesis for many reasons. The 
benchmark is an indicator of general-purpose performance of computers and has 
remained in broad use in the embedded computing world [20]. Also, the Dhrystone 
benchmark gives a representative distribution of instructions that the MIPS R2000 is 
capable of executing; this characteristic is important for fault-injection analysis. 
Additionally, the Dhrystone benchmark has a relatively small number of instructions, 
making the simulation time more practical. A similar test setup for this processor can be 
found in [21].
The Dhrystone benchmark is composed of 8 main “procedures” and 3 main 
“functions”. In this thesis, the instructions of the main procedures and functions were 
used with fault injection to test the effectiveness of the TESM. The frequency of 
instructions that each function and procedure contains can be seen in Table 2.
From the table, it can be observed that “Proc 1”, “Proc 6”, and “Func 2” have the largest 
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Table 2: Instruction distribution for each section of the Dhrystone benchmark
ANDI ADDI ADDIU ORI J BEQ BNE ALU SW
Proc 1 0 0 14 0 0 1 0 5 32
Proc 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1
Proc 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Proc 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Proc 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Proc 6 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 2 8
Proc 7 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Proc 8 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 8
Func 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0
Func 2 1 0 9 0 0 1 0 1 8
Func 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
number of instructions and therefore provide the most information. Also, all sections of 
the benchmark are dominated by load and store operations. Based on the high percentage 
of memory operations, the Dhrystone benchmark results should resemble the frequency 
of results from the individual load and store tests. 
Fault Injection Procedure
Fault injection is a technique used to test the reliability of a circuit by introducing 
faults in locations of interest and observing the effect they have on the output of the 
circuit. Fault injection mechanisms can be classified into two areas: hardware-based and 
software-based. Hardware-based fault injection involves using equipment to physically 
mimic an SET. An example of hardware-based fault injection with direct hardware 
contact is using a power supply to apply a voltage to a test point. Hardware-based fault 
injection with indirect contact is performed with a laser beam, proton accelerator, or any 
other device that can mimic an SET without applying a probe. Software-based fault 
injection involves using a stimulus in the programming environment to invert a bit value. 
This can be done either at run-time or during compile-time. For compile-time testing, the 
program instruction is modified before the image is loaded and executed. For run-time 
testing, the fault injection is triggered by a mechanism like time-out, exception, or code-
insertion [22]. 
Hardware-based fault injection is beneficial because the user has good 
controllability of the fault injection times. Also, there is little to no perturbation of the 
target system. In other words, the target system is almost identical to the system that will 
be used. An additional advantage is that hardware-based fault injection mimics the 
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natural physical phenomena of fault injection and therefore gives a relatively accurate 
depiction of how a system will react in a natural radiative environment. 
A major disadvantage to using this fault injection mechanism is that it is costly. 
Once a system has been tested using a proton or heavy ion beam, the permanent radiation 
damage prevents the target system from being used in practice and for future testing. 
Another key issue is accessibility to a hardware-based fault injection testing environment. 
Currently there are fewer than 30 cyclotrons in the United States. In order to conduct a 
test, it is necessary to schedule a test session and travel to one of these locations. This can 
lengthen the time it takes to verify that a system is radiation-hardened. 
Software-based fault injection is beneficial because it does not require expensive 
hardware. Simulations can be done with no cost by inserting additional fault-injection 
code into the VHDL model. An additional advantage is that software-based fault injection 
can target specific applications and operating systems. This speeds up the test time 
because the user does not have to wait for critical errors. 
Software-based fault injection is the method used in this thesis to determine the 
architectural vulnerability of the MIPS R2000 processor to soft errors and the 
effectiveness of the TESM. 
Methodology
Soft errors were simulated by using a VHDL description of XOR gates with the 
control bits and a 12-bit fault injection signature as the inputs, shown in Figure 11. This 
method is similar to the one proposed in [23]. Faults were injected one at a time into the 
control bits of every possible instruction during each program flow cycle. A high-level 
view of the fault injection locations can be seen in Figure 12.
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For fault injection, two test-setups were used. In the first test setup, two copies of 
the MIPS processor were instantiated. The first copy contained the original MIPS VHDL 
code and can be considered the “golden” copy. The second copy contained nodes with 
fault injection capability and can be considered the “dirty” copy. These copies were 
instantiated in an outer module that acted as a test logger. The Dhrystone benchmark was 
run on both copies and faults were injected into the “dirty” copy. At the end of each trial 
the results of each instruction were recorded by the test logger and compared to the 
original results data. This data was used to quantify the inherent vulnerability of the 
MIPS R2000 processor.
The second test setup was similar to the first setup except that the “dirty” copy 
was replaced with the TESM-modified MIPS processor. The same procedure was run, 
and the test logger recorded the differences in output. This data was used to determine the 
effectiveness of the TESM in detecting timing errors.
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Figure 11: XOR gate fault injection model [23]
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Figure 12: High-level view of the fault injection locations used for testing
The monitor block shown in Figure 13 is a VHDL testbench run in ModelSim 
version 6.1. It contained the following concurrently running processes. The “Initial” 
process contains the initial parameters for the testbench including the triggers to reset the 
test. The “Clock” process sets the clock period to 100 nanoseconds. The “Run-time” 
process manually records the run time of the simulation excluding the load time. The 
“Loading” process loads the Dhrystone benchmark into the instruction memory of the 
MIPS processor. The “Error Detection” process checks the error flag once per rising 
clock edge. Once an error is detected the process waits for the simulation is reset. The 
“Fault Generation” process activates one of the 35 possible fault injection nodes. The 
process rotates the fault location once per test. The “Fault Propagation” process checks 
for the “commit” signal from the “golden” copy on each rising clock edge. When the 
“commit” signal of the “golden” copy is asserted, the process checks the “commit” 
signal, data bus, and memory bus of “dirty” copy. 
Logic Synthesis
In the microprocessor design process, after the VHDL description of the circuit is 
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Figure 13: Block diagram of fault injection test setup
Fault Injection Block
“Dirty” MIPS Core
“”Golden” MIPS Core
Testbench Monitor 
Block
clock
reset
Fault Mask
written and tested, it is mapped to a specific technology. This mapping from an HDL 
description to logic gates in a technology cell library is referred to as logic synthesis. 
Synthesizing the circuit provides the fabrication layout for the design. At this level, the 
physical characteristics of the circuit such as the area, maximum clock speed, and power 
consumption can be obtained based on the technology used. 
The MIPS R2000 processor and our design were synthesized to the 
FreePDK45[24] cell library using Cadence RTL Compiler for power, timing, and area 
information. The FreePDK45 cell library was developed by the Oklahoma State 
University VLSI Computer Architecture Group; it consists of 33 cells with a 45-nm 
transistor size. This library was developed based on the official scalable CMOS 
(SCMOS) design rules of the Metal Oxide Semiconductor Implementation Service 
(MOSIS). MOSIS is one of the oldest semiconductor fabrication plants. The FreePDK45 
library was chosen because it was an open-source implementation of a current fabrication 
technology. 
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CHAPTER VII
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results for the instruction characterization can be seen in Figure 14. The TESM can 
detect approximately 60% of all control-flow errors that are observable on the output of 
the microprocessor.
The results for the fault injection simulation with the Dhrystone benchmark can be seen 
in Figure 15. The results show that the TESM detected an error 81% of the time.  In both 
tests, no false detections occurred. Figure 16 shows the distribution of errors separated by 
sections of the Dhrystone benchmark.
30
Figure 14: Distribution of detected errors
The power, timing, and area information for the MIPS R2000 processor and our hardened 
MIPS R2000 processor design can be seen in Table 3. As the table shows, the addition of 
our control flow monitor has minimal effects on the maximum clock frequency and area 
of the circuit with a slightly greater effect on power consumption.
Table 3: Comparison of area, timing, and power between the original MIPS and the MIPS 
with the temporal embedded signature monitor
Area (mm2) Timing (MHz) Power (mW)
Original MIPS 33,414 222 1.44
MIPS w/ TESM 33,665 216 1.61
% increase 0.75 -2.64 11.73
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Figure 15: Error distribution of Dhrystone benchmark
Figure 16: Error by type distribution for each section of the benchmark
The difference in error detection rate for the single instruction testing compared to 
the Dhrystone benchmark testing could be detected error to the high volume of memory 
instructions executed in the Dhrystone benchmark. As seen in Figure 16, the sections of 
the benchmark with the most undetected errors, “Proc 6”, “Proc 8”, and “Func 2”, also 
contain the largest percentage of ADDIU instructions. This trend is consistent with the 
inherent vulnerability of the ADDIU instruction.
The results show that using the temporal embedded signature monitor design with 
the MIPS processor improves the reliability of the processor with less than 1% increase in 
area. This is a significant reduction for such a small area penalty. Consider a parity check 
circuit for the control flow bits of each stage in the processor. With 12 potential control-
flow bits per stage, and a 5-stage pipeline, a simple parity checker implementation would 
require approximately 60 XOR gates. Synthesizing this implementation with the same 
library would potentially result in twice the increase in area compared to the TESM. 
Similarly, dual modular redundancy implemented on the control-flow bits would require 
approximately 60 XOR gates and would result in a similar area increase. In both 
situations, the number of false detected errors would increase significantly because errors 
will be detected that do not propagate to the commit stage. Additionally, for processors 
with longer pipelines, the TESM should still maintain a relatively small area increase 
because it only calls for two additional flip-flops per pipeline stage. The parity and dual 
modular redundancy implementations would require 12 additional gates per stage. 
According to the results, the TESM was most effective for non-R-type 
instructions. This is consistent with predictions because R-type instructions in the MIPS 
processor complete in the same number of cycles. Therefore errors in R-type instructions 
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that convert the instruction to other R-type instructions will go undetected. Memory 
instructions were predicted to have 100% coverage because they have unique completion 
times from any other instruction. The Dhrystone benchmark results indicate that this 
prediction is accurate. 
Note that using the TESM does not preclude the use of other detection 
mechanisms. With less than 1% area overhead, the TESM could be joined with parity or 
dual modular redundancy on the ALU to provide more detection but with less area 
penalty than a full parity or dual modular redundancy implementation. The substantial 
increase in power can be attributed to the TESM operating during all stages (Fetch, 
Decode, Execute, Memory, Write-back) of the instruction flow. However, the switching 
activity of the MIPS processor is separated by stage. For instance, the Fetch, Decode, 
Execute, and Memory stages are static while the instruction is in the Write-back stage. In 
a pipelined implementation, the switching power of the MIPS processor would be greater 
because each stage would contain constantly switching signals. Therefore, the TESM 
would contribute to a smaller percentage of the overall power.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
This thesis presented a hardware technique to detect errors in the control flow of a 
MIPS R2000 processor. This design can be used as a low-cost measure to reduce control-
flow soft errors in microprocessors. An expansion of this study could include 
implementing the TESM on a larger instruction set to compare the area increase with 
instruction set size. Also, testing the TESM with a pipelined MIPS implementation 
should produce similar results presented in this thesis so including this testing in a future 
study could provide verification. Additionally, the TESM can be expanded to work with 
instruction sets of greater complexity and coupled with techniques to mitigate the soft 
errors once they have been detected.
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APPENDIX A
TESM VHDL BEHAVIORAL DESCRIPTION
This appendix displays the VHDL behavioral description of the temporal 
embedded signature monitor discussed in this thesis. 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.all; 
use IEEE.numeric_std.all; 
entity TESM is 
  port( CLK: in std_logic; 
       Instr: in UNSIGNED(31 DOWNTO 0); 
       Read_In: in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 DOWNTO 0); 
       Check_In: in STD_LOGIC; 
       Err_Flag: out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 DOWNTO 0) 
); 
end TESM; 
architecture Behavioral of TESM is 
  SIGNAL cnt: STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 DOWNTO 0); 
  SIGNAL cnt2: STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 DOWNTO 0); 
  SIGNAL stage1: STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 DOWNTO 0); 
  SIGNAL stage2: STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 DOWNTO 0); 
  SIGNAL stage3: STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 DOWNTO 0); 
  constant lw:   UNSIGNED(5 downto 0) := "100011";  -- 35 
  constant jump: UNSIGNED(5 downto 0) := "000010";  -- 2 
  constant jump_register: UNSIGNED(5 downto 0) := "001000"; -- 8 
  constant beq:  UNSIGNED(5 downto 0) := "000100";  -- 4 
  constant bne:  UNSIGNED(5 downto 0) := "000101";  -- 5 
  constant dont_care: UNSIGNED(5 downto 0) := "000000"; 
  constant r_type: UNSIGNED(5 downto 0) := "000000"; 
  alias opcode: UNSIGNED(5 downto 0) is Instr(31 downto 26); 
  alias F_Code: UNSIGNED(5 downto 0) is Instr(5 downto 0); 
begin 
-- DECODER 
WITH opcode SELECT 
cnt <="00" WHEN jump, -- Jump takes 2 cycles 
"11" WHEN lw, -- Load takes 5 cycles 
"01" WHEN beq, -- Conditional branch takes 4 cycles 
"01" WHEN bne, -- Conditional branch takes 4 cycles 
"10" WHEN OTHERS; -- R_type or Jump Register 
WITH F_Code & opcode SELECT 
cnt2 <= "01" WHEN "001000" & r_type, -- Jump Reg takes 
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3 cycles 
cnt WHEN OTHERS; -- other R_type/I_type instructions 
take 4 cycles 
-- END DECODER 
WITH Read_In & Check_In SELECT 
Err_Flag <= cnt2 XOR Read_In  WHEN "001", 
stage1 XOR Read_In  WHEN "011", 
stage2 XOR Read_In  WHEN "101", 
stage3 XOR Read_In  WHEN "111", 
"00" WHEN OTHERS; 
regs: PROCESS (clk) 
BEGIN 
if rising_edge(clk) then 
stage1 <= cnt2; 
stage2 <= stage1; 
stage3 <= stage2; 
end if; 
END PROCESS regs; 
end Behavioral;
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APPENDIX B
HARDENED MIPS WITH FAULT INJECTION VHDL BEHAVIORAL DESCRIPTION
This appendix displays the VHDL behavioral description of the MIPS R2000 
processor with the fault injection nodes and the temporal embedded signature monitor 
that was discussed in this thesis. 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE.std_logic_1164.all; 
use IEEE.numeric_std.all; 
entity MIPS is 
  port(CLK, RST: in std_logic; 
       CS, WE, IRAM_select: out std_logic; 
    ERR_MASK: in UNSIGNED(35 DOWNTO 0); 
       ADDR: out unsigned (31 downto 0); 
       Err_Flag: out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 DOWNTO 0); 
   Commit: out std_logic; 
   nState_OUT: out std_logic; 
WD_Check: out std_logic; 
       Mem_Bus: inout unsigned(31 downto 0)); 
end MIPS; 
architecture structure of MIPS is 
  component REG is 
    port(CLK: in std_logic; 
         RegW: in std_logic; 
         DR, SR1, SR2: in unsigned(4 downto 0); 
         Reg_In: in unsigned(31 downto 0); 
         ReadReg1, ReadReg2: out unsigned(31 downto 0) 
); 
  end component; 
  component Watchdog_Timer is 
port(CLK: in std_logic; 
       Instr: in UNSIGNED(31 DOWNTO 0); 
       Read_In: in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 DOWNTO 0); 
       Check_In: in STD_LOGIC; 
       Err_Flag: out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 DOWNTO 0) 
); 
end component; 
--  SIGNAL timer_cnt: unsigned := '1'; 
--  SIGNAL test1, test2, test3, test4: unsigned := '0'; 
  type Operation is (and1,or1,add,sub,slt,shr,shl,jr,add2); 
  signal Op, OpSave: Operation := and1; 
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  type Instr_Format is (R, I, J);  -- (Arithmetic, Addr_Imm, Jump) 
  signal Format: Instr_Format := R; 
  signal Instr, Imm_Ext: unsigned (31 downto 0); 
  signal PC, nPC, ReadReg1, ReadReg2, Reg_In: unsigned(31 downto 0); 
  signal ALU_InA, ALU_InB, ALU_Result: unsigned(31 downto 0); 
  signal ALU_Result_Save: unsigned(31 downto 0); 
  signal ALUorMEM, RegW, FetchDorI, Writing, REGorIMM: std_logic := 
'0'; 
  signal REGorIMM_Save, ALUorMEM_Save: std_logic := '0'; 
  signal DR: unsigned(4 downto 0); 
--  signal State: integer range 0 to 4 := 0; 
  signal State, nState : integer range 0 to 4 := 0; 
  signal WD_Read_In: STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 DOWNTO 0) := "00"; 
  signal WD_Check_In: STD_LOGIC; 
  --signal WD_Check_In_OUT: STD_LOGIC; 
  signal F_Code2: unsigned (5 downto 0); -- Added for Error 
Injection  
  signal Opcode_State0: unsigned (5 downto 0); -- Added for Error 
Injection 
  signal Opcode_State1: unsigned (5 downto 0); -- Added for Error 
Injection 
  signal Opcode_State2: unsigned (5 downto 0); -- Added for Error 
Injection 
  signal Opcode_State3: unsigned (5 downto 0); -- Added for Error 
Injection 
  signal Opcode_State4: unsigned (5 downto 0); -- Added for Error 
Injection 
  constant addi: unsigned(5 downto 0) := "001000";  -- 8 
  constant andi: unsigned(5 downto 0) := "001100";  -- 12 
  constant ori:  unsigned(5 downto 0) := "001101";  -- 13 
  constant lw:   unsigned(5 downto 0) := "100011";  -- 35 
  constant sw:   unsigned(5 downto 0) := "101011";  -- 43 
  constant beq:  unsigned(5 downto 0) := "000100";  -- 4 
  constant bne:  unsigned(5 downto 0) := "000101";  -- 5 
  constant jump: unsigned(5 downto 0) := "000010";  -- 2 
-- Added Instructions -- 
  constant addiu: unsigned(5 downto 0) := "001001";  -- 9 WORKS! 
  alias opcode: unsigned(5 downto 0) is Instr(31 downto 26); 
  alias SR1: unsigned(4 downto 0) is Instr(25 downto 21); 
  alias SR2: unsigned(4 downto 0) is Instr(20 downto 16); 
  alias F_Code: unsigned(5 downto 0) is Instr(5 downto 0); 
  alias NumShift: unsigned(4 downto 0) is Instr(10 downto 6); 
  alias ImmField: unsigned (15 downto 0) is Instr(15 downto 0); 
begin 
 
  WD_CHECK_IN <= '1' WHEN nState = 0 else '0'; 
  WD_CHECK <= WD_CHECK_IN; 
  WD1: TESM port map( 
CLK => CLK, 
Instr => Instr, 
Read_In => WD_Read_In, 
Check_In => WD_Check_In, 
Err_Flag => Err_Flag 
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); 
  A1: Reg port map (CLK, RegW, DR, SR1, SR2, Reg_In, ReadReg1, 
ReadReg2); 
  Imm_Ext <= x"FFFF" & Instr(15 downto 0) when Instr(15) = '1' 
    else x"0000" & Instr(15 downto 0);  -- Sign extend immediate field 
  DR <= Instr(15 downto 11) when Format = R 
    else Instr(20 downto 16);           -- Destination Register MUX 
(MUX1) 
  ALU_InA <= ReadReg1; 
  ALU_InB <= Imm_Ext when REGorIMM_Save = '1' else ReadReg2;   -- ALU 
MUX (MUX2) 
  Reg_in <= Mem_Bus when ALUorMEM_Save = '1' else ALU_Result_Save; -- 
Data MUX 
  Format <= R when Opcode_State0 = 0 else J when Opcode_State0 = 2 else 
I; 
  Mem_Bus <= ReadReg2 when Writing = '1' else 
    "ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ"; -- drive memory bus only during 
writes 
  ADDR <= PC when FetchDorI = '1' else ALU_Result_Save; --ADDR Mux 
  IRAM_select <= FetchDorI; 
  F_Code2 <= F_Code XOR ERR_MASK(35 DOWNTO 30); -- Added for 
Error Injection 
  Opcode_State0 <= Opcode XOR ERR_MASK(29 DOWNTO 24); -- Added for 
Error Injection 
  Opcode_State1 <= Opcode XOR ERR_MASK(23 DOWNTO 18); -- Added for 
Error Injection 
  Opcode_State2 <= Opcode XOR ERR_MASK(17 DOWNTO 12); -- Added for 
Error Injection 
  Opcode_State3 <= Opcode XOR ERR_MASK(11 DOWNTO 6); -- Added for 
Error Injection 
  Opcode_State4 <= Opcode XOR ERR_MASK(5 DOWNTO 0); -- Added for 
Error Injection 
  process(State, PC, Instr, Format, F_Code, F_Code2, opcode, 
Opcode_State1, Opcode_State2, Opcode_State3, Opcode_State4, Op, 
ALU_InA, ALU_InB, 
          Imm_Ext, OpSave) 
  begin 
    FetchDorI <= '0'; CS <= '0'; WE <= '0'; RegW <= '0'; Writing <= 
'0'; 
    ALU_Result <= "00000000000000000000000000000000"; 
    npc <= pc; Op <= jr; REGorIMM <= '0'; ALUorMEM <= '0'; 
WD_Read_In <= "00"; 
    case state is 
      when 0 =>  --fetch instruction 
        nPC <= PC + 1; CS <= '1'; nState <= 1; 
        FetchDorI <= '1'; 
      when 1 => 
        nState <= 2; REGorIMM <= '0'; ALUorMEM <= '0'; 
        if Format = J then 
          nPC <= "000000" & Instr(25 downto 0); nState <= 0; --jump, 
and finish  
        elsif Format = R then  -- register instructions 
          if    F_code2 = "100000" then Op <= add;   -- add
 
          elsif F_code2 = "100010" then Op <= sub;   -- subtract 
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          elsif F_code2 = "100100" then Op <= and1;  -- and 
          elsif F_code2 = "100101" then Op <= or1;   -- or 
          elsif F_code2 = "101010" then Op <= slt;   -- set on less 
than 
          elsif F_code2 = "000010" then Op <= shr;   -- shift right 
          elsif F_code2 = "000000" then Op <= shl;   -- shift left 
          elsif F_code2 = "001000" then Op <= jr;    -- jump register 
          end if; 
        elsif Format = I then -- immediate instructions 
          REGorIMM <= '1'; 
          if Opcode_State1 = lw or Opcode_State1 = sw or Opcode_State1 
= addi then Op <= add; 
          elsif Opcode_State1 = beq or Opcode_State1 = bne then Op <= 
sub; REGorIMM <= '0'; 
          elsif Opcode_State1 = andi then Op <= and1; 
          elsif Opcode_State1 = ori then Op <= or1; 
-- ADDED INSTRUCTIONS -- 
  elsif Opcode_State1 = addiu then Op <= add2;  
          end if; 
          if Opcode_State1 = lw then ALUorMEM <= '1'; end if; 
        end if; 
      when 2 => 
WD_Read_In <= "01";    --WD_Check_In <= '1'; 
        nState <= 3; 
        if   OpSave = and1 then ALU_Result <= ALU_InA and ALU_InB; 
        elsif OpSave = or1 then ALU_Result <= ALU_InA or ALU_InB; 
        elsif OpSave = add then ALU_Result <= ALU_InA + ALU_InB; 
        elsif OpSave = sub then ALU_Result <= ALU_InA - ALU_InB; 
        elsif OpSave = shr then ALU_Result <= ALU_InB srl 
to_integer(numshift); 
        elsif OpSave = shl then ALU_Result <= ALU_InB sll 
to_integer(numshift); 
        elsif OpSave = slt then -- set on less than 
          if ALU_InA < ALU_InB then ALU_Result <= X"00000001"; 
          else ALU_Result <= X"00000000"; 
          end if; 
-- ADDED INSTRUCTIONS -- 
        elsif OpSave = add2 then ALU_Result <= UNSIGNED(ALU_InA) + 
UNSIGNED(ALU_InB); 
 
-- END OF ADDED INSTRUCTIONS -- 
        end if; 
       if ((ALU_InA = ALU_InB) and Opcode_State2 = beq) or 
           ((ALU_InA /= ALU_InB) and Opcode_State2 = bne) then 
          nPC <= PC + Imm_Ext; nState <= 0; 
        elsif opcode_State2 = bne or opcode_State2 = beq then nState <= 
0; 
        elsif OpSave = jr then nPC <= ALU_InA; nState <= 0; 
        end if; 
      when 3 => 
        nState <= 0;  
WD_Read_In <= "10";    --WD_Check_In <= '1'; 
        if Format = R or Opcode_State3 = addi or Opcode_State3 = andi 
or Opcode_State3 = ori or Opcode_State3 = addiu then 
          RegW <= '1'; 
        elsif Opcode_State3 = sw then CS <= '1'; WE <= '1'; Writing <= 
'1'; 
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        elsif Opcode_State3 = lw then CS <= '1'; nState <= 4; 
        end if; 
      when 4 => 
WD_Read_In <= "11";     --WD_Check_In <= '1'; 
       nState <= 0; CS <= '1';  
       if Opcode_State4 = lw then RegW <= '1'; end if; 
    end case; 
  end process; 
  process(CLK) 
  begin 
    if CLK = '1' and CLK'event then 
      if rst = '1' then 
        State <= 0; 
        PC <= x"00000000"; 
nState_OUT <= '0'; 
Commit <= '0'; 
      else 
nState_OUT <= '0'; 
Commit <= '0'; 
        State <= nState; 
        PC <= nPC; 
      end if; 
      if State = 0 then Instr <= Mem_Bus; 
  end if; 
      if State = 1 then 
         OpSave <= Op; 
         REGorIMM_Save <= REGorIMM; 
         ALUorMEM_Save <= ALUorMEM; 
      end if; 
      if State = 2 then ALU_Result_Save <= ALU_Result; 
  end if; 
if nState = 0 then 
nState_OUT <= '1'; 
Commit <= '1'; 
end if; 
    end if; 
  end process; 
end structure; 
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